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The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering
Corporate Criminal Prosecution
David M. Uhlmann*
Corporate crime continues to occur at an alarming rate, yet
disagreement persists among scholars and practitioners about the role of
corporate criminal prosecution. Some argue that corporations should face
criminal prosecution for their misconduct, while others would reserve
criminal prosecution for individual corporate officials. Perhaps as a result
of this conflict, there has been a dramatic increase over the last decade in
the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements for some
corporate crimes, even as the government continues to bring criminal
charges for other corporate crimes. To move beyond our erratic approach
to corporate crime, we need a better understanding of what is
accomplished by the criminal prosecution of corporations, a construct that
considers retributive and utilitarian theories but also takes into account
the expressive function of criminal law and the societal need for
condemnation, accountability, and justice when crime occurs.
In this article, I provide a justification for corporate criminal
prosecution that identifies the moral content of corporate crime, considers
the deterrent value of corporate prosecution, and explains why the
expressive value of the criminal law is indispensable in the corporate
context. Corporate wrongdoing has pernicious effects on our communities,
the economy, and the environment, which warrant the condemnation the
criminal law provides. Criminal prosecution of corporations upholds the
rule of law, validates the choices of law-abiding companies, and promotes
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series at the University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Samantha Kirby for her
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accountability. Together those values contribute to our sense that justice
has been done when crime occurs, which enhances trust in the legal
system, provides the opportunity for societal catharsis, and allows us to
move forward in the aftermath of criminal activity. When corporations
face no consequences for their criminal behavior, we minimize their
lawlessness, and increase cynicism about the outsized influence of
corporations.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, the Justice Department morphed its
approach to corporate crime, eschewing criminal prosecutions in favor
of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements that allowed
large corporations to avoid the ignominy of criminal convictions.1 The
trend began during the Bush administration and became so dominant
during the Obama administration that the Criminal Division of the
Justice Department entered deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements in more than two-thirds of the corporate cases it resolved
between 2010 and 2012.2 There seemingly were no crimes that did not
qualify for corporate absolution. The Justice Department entered a
non-prosecution agreement in the Upper Big Branch mine disaster that
killed twenty-nine miners, even though the Labor Department found
that the mine owner had committed over 300 egregious violations of
federal mine safety laws.3 The Justice Department agreed to a deferred
prosecution with HSBC, even though the bank was involved in nearly
a trillion dollars of money laundering, much of it from drug
trafficking.4 There were no prosecutions at all — deferred or otherwise
— for the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, even
though financial institutions and officials within those companies took
unnecessary risks and engaged in conduct that imperiled the global
economy.5
1 In a deferred prosecution agreement, criminal charges are filed but eventually
dismissed if the corporation complies with the terms of the agreement; in a non
prosecution agreement, criminal charges are never even filed if the company meets its
obligations under the agreement. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non
Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV.
1295, 1301 n.43 (2013) [hereinafter Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability].
2 It is difficult to overstate the surge in deferred and non prosecution agreements
and the shift away from criminal prosecution of corporations. From 1992 to 2004, the
Justice Department entered 26 deferred and non prosecution agreements, an average
of just over two per year. From 2004 to 2012, the Department entered 242 deferred
and non prosecution agreements, an average of just over 30 per year. Between 2010
and 2012, the Criminal Division entered twice as many deferred prosecution and non
prosecution agreements as plea agreements. David M. Uhlmann, Op Ed., Prosecution
Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2013, at A23.
3 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1 at 1295 300;
David M. Uhlmann, Op Ed., For 29 Dead Miners, No Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011,
at A25 [hereinafter 29 Dead Miners].
4 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1 at 1337 38.
5 See, e.g., Sewall Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2011, at A1 (describing the events leading up to the financial crash and the
subsequent reports issued after a federal inquiry); Crash Course: The Origins of the
Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/

1238

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 49:1235

Then, with public alarm increasing over the lack of criminal
prosecutions for the financial crisis,6 the pendulum swung, and
criminal prosecutions were back in vogue. In 2014, the Justice
Department brought record-setting criminal prosecutions against the
European banks Credit Suisse and BNP Paribas for currency
manipulation.7 Similar prosecutions followed during 2015 against JP
Morgan Chase and Citicorp — apparently no longer “too big to jail”
— as well as Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS.8 Volkswagen
will likely face criminal charges for using defeat devices to conceal
motor vehicle emissions violations, even though Toyota Motor
Company and General Motors received deferred prosecutions for
concealing motor vehicle safety violations during 2014 and 2015.9
To be fair, some parts of the Justice Department never stopped
prosecuting corporate crime. The Environment and Natural Resources
Division, historically the source of the largest number of corporate

schoolsbrief/21584534 effects financial crisis are still being felt five years article
(discussing generally the history of the financial crisis). See generally THE FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011), available at
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report (outlining the findings of the commission created to
examine the financial crisis).
6 See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2014/jan/09/financial crisis why no executive prosecutions/. See also Court
E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on the Justice
Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 101, 123 26 (2014)
(observing that, in aftermath of financial crisis, Justice Department has been under
pressure to address wrongdoing at financial institutions amidst public perception that
criminal conduct caused crisis); Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 265, 278 80 (2014) (noting demand for criminal prosecutions and
recognizing that they may have value but not as a substitute for regulatory reform to
prevent similar financial crises in the future).
7 Ben Protess & Jessica Silver Greenberg, Big Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty in Felony
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A1; Ben Protess & Jessica Silver Greenberg, BNP
Admits Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9 Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2014, at B1.
8 Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Banks Admit Scheme to Rig Currency Price, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2015, at A1.
9 Compare Del Quentin Wilber & Greg Farrell, Volkswagen Said Focus of U.S.
Criminal Probe on Emissions, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 21, 2015, 5:16 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015 09 21/volkswagen said to be target of
u s criminal probe on emissions, with Bill Vlasic & Matt Apuzzo, Toyota Is Fined $1.2
Billion for Concealing Safety Defects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, at B1, and Danielle
Ivory & Bill Vlasic, $900 Million Penalty for G.M.’s Deadly Defect Leaves Many Cold,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, at B1. For a critique of the GM deferred prosecution
agreement, see David M. Uhlmann, Op Ed., Justice Falls Short in G.M. Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2015, at SR5.
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prosecutions,10 entered only two deferred prosecutions in the
seventeen years between 1993 and 2009; the Antitrust Division, the
source of the third largest amount of corporate prosecutions, entered
only three deferred prosecutions during the same timeframe.11 Still,
the Criminal Division employs the largest number of prosecutors in
the Justice Department and is responsible for its most high-profile
matters. Ambivalence within the Criminal Division about whether
corporations should be prosecuted for their crimes — across two
ideologically disparate administrations — suggests uncertainty about
the role of corporate criminal prosecution.
The legal basis for imposing criminal liability on corporations is
well-settled. Corporations are criminally liable for the acts of their
employees or agents, committed within the scope of the employment
or agency, for the benefit of the corporation.12 The corporation must
act with the mental state required by the statute in question, which
involves imputing the mental state of individual employees or agents
to the corporation.13 In cases where no corporate employee or agent
possesses the requisite mental state, however, criminal liability may be
imposed based on the collective knowledge of the corporate
employees or agents.14 It is not a defense for a corporation to argue
that the conduct was not authorized by the board or officers of the
corporation.15 Nor is it a defense to argue that the conduct was
prohibited by official policies of the corporation or even the express
instructions of supervisors.16
10 Environmental crimes historically are the subject matter of the largest number
of corporate prosecutions. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions,
97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1873 (2011) [hereinafter Globalized Corporate Prosecutions].
11 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1318 19
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME 15 nn.29 & 35 (2009)).
12 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909).
New York Central requires the first two elements: (1) acts of employees or agents; and
(2) committed within the scope of the employment or agency. Subsequent decisions
have added for the benefit of the corporation as a way of ensuring that the conduct is
within the scope of the employment or agency. See, e.g., United States v. Potter, 463
F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). The employee or agent acts for the benefit of the
corporation even if the employee or agent acts for her own benefit, as long as the
employee or agent acts at least in part to benefit the corporation. United States v.
Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
13 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing
Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1964)).
14 Id. at 856.
15 United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (citations
omitted).
16 Id.
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What then explains the conflicted approach to criminal prosecution
of corporations — and what does it reveal about the theoretical basis
for corporate criminal liability? A cynical response would be that the
revolving door between Criminal Division leadership and white-collar
law firms leads to a lack of resolve about the need to prosecute
corporations.17 Perhaps there is greater willingness among career
prosecutors to prosecute corporations, but my sense is that the
political leadership of the Justice Department is faithful to its law
enforcement mission and wants to bring high-profile cases when the
law and the facts allow. A more nuanced view is that the Justice
Department’s erratic approach reflects a lack of agreement among
practitioners about what is accomplished by the criminal prosecution
of corporations, a disagreement that also exists in scholarly accounts
of corporate criminal liability focusing on retributive and utilitarian
purposes of punishment.18
Critics of corporate prosecution argue that there is no retributive
purpose served by criminal punishment of corporations. They assert
that criminal prosecution should be reserved for individuals, since
corporate entities have no moral capacity.19 In addition, they claim
that prosecuting corporations punishes shareholders and employees
who had no role in the wrongdoing.20 From a utilitarian perspective,
the critique focuses on the fact that the sanctions for corporate
misconduct — monetary penalties and structural reforms — are the
same regardless of whether the punishment occurs as the result of

17 See, e.g., Ben Protess, Once More Through the Revolving Door for Justice’s Breuer,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at B6.
18 See infra Part I.
19 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319, 320 (1996) (“Corporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions cannot commit
criminal acts. Nor can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind. Only people can
act and only people can have a guilty state of mind.”). This view is not so settled
among moral philosophers. See generally Business Ethics: 2.1 Is the Corporation a Moral
Agent?, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 16, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/ethics business/#CorMorAge (describing debate over whether corporations are
moral actors independent of individuals that comprise the corporation).
20 Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19 at 349 (“[I]n the case of a corporation, the
burden of a punitive award will fall primarily on the shareholders, most of whom
usually have no connection to the wrongdoing in question.”); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1359, 1367 69 (2009) [hereinafter Two Ways] (“The penalties imposed on
innocent shareholders and employees when corporations are convicted are not
incidental, collateral, or secondary. They are what the punishment of a collective
entity is all about.”).
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criminal or civil enforcement.21 This deterrence-based argument gains
credence based on economic analysis suggesting that criminal
enforcement may be less effective in promoting future compliance
efforts, because companies are not incentivized to disclose and address
wrongdoing if criminal prosecution (as opposed to civil enforcement)
might ensue.22
Supporters of corporate prosecution argue that criminal
enforcement is an essential tool to promote compliance with the law.23
They insist that there is a retributive role for corporate punishment,
since wrongdoing in the corporate context deserves censure just as
much as it does where individual conduct is involved.24 Moreover,
when the corporation benefits from the misconduct, it cheats against
its competitors; corporate misconduct therefore should be considered
blameworthy in a moral and retributive sense. From a utilitarian
perspective, advocates of corporate prosecution concede that the
sanctions may be similar but assert that the deterrent effect of criminal
punishment is necessarily greater than civil punishment, both because
of the reputational harm imposed by criminal prosecution and the
collateral consequences that may result from a criminal conviction.25
My view is that both corporations and individuals must be held
accountable when misconduct occurs in the corporate setting.26 From
a practical standpoint, corporate wrongdoing has a pernicious effect
that warrants the use of all available tools to address it. The notion
that criminal and civil sanctions are indistinguishable is belied by my
experience as a federal prosecutor, including seven years as the Chief
21 See, e.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996) (“[S]ome justification for corporate criminal
liability may have existed in the past, when civil enforcement techniques were not
well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little now supports the
continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on corporations.”).
22 See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 866 67 (1994).
23 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1482 86 (2009) (arguing that “[b]ecause of their size,
complexity, and control of vast resources, corporations have the ability to engage in
misconduct that dwarfs” that of individuals, such that corporations must also be held
accountable).
24 See id. at 1485.
25 See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND.
L.J. 473, 500 03 (2006) [hereinafter Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability]
(examining what deterrence for entities may result from reputational harm);
Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1335 (explaining
what collateral consequences may result from criminal prosecution).
26 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1295 96.
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of the Justice Department’s Environmental Crimes Section, when
corporate officials and their attorneys uniformly insisted that they
would prefer civil enforcement to criminal prosecution.27 From a
theoretical perspective, there are both retributive and utilitarian
justifications for corporate criminal punishment. I would suggest that
corporations are moral actors, with the capacity to act intentionally
and to do good or evil, despite the fact that they do not have
consciences, beliefs, or desires like individuals.28 I also assert that
there is additional deterrent value associated with criminal charges
against corporations. Companies do not want to be labeled corporate
criminals and therefore may have more incentives to avoid criminal
sanctions than otherwise comparable civil or administrative
sanctions.29
Yet the focus on retributive and utilitarian justifications — both in
practice and in academia — obscures the expressive function of the
criminal law and the societal need for condemnation, accountability,
and justice when crime occurs. As Joel Feinberg explained with regard
to the prosecution of individuals,30 an essential role of the criminal law
is to make clear what conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable
behavior and to express societal condemnation of unlawful conduct.31
The criminal law imposes blame and provides accountability for illegal
behavior.32 The criminal law also validates the choices made by those
who comply with the law by imposing punishment upon those who
break the law. When criminal violations occur but are ignored or
addressed by non-criminal alternatives, we obscure the line that the
27 As Chief of the Environmental Crimes Section, I was responsible for approving
all charging decisions in cases prosecuted by my office, including hundreds of cases
involving charges against corporations.
28 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1333 34; see
Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 833, 846 51 (2000) (examining how unique viewpoints, attitudes and moral
judgments are attributed to corporations).
29 I acknowledge that corporate officials may be most incentivized to comply with
the law by the prospect that they could go to jail if they engage in wrongdoing. David
M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime, and the
Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1443 (2011) [hereinafter After the Spill]
(explaining that the possibility of incarceration is more likely to result in corporation’s
compliance).
30 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965).
31 See John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291,
311 (1998) [hereinafter Crisis in the Ideology of Crime].
32 See generally Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25,
at 492 94 (showing how individuals blame and hold entities accountable for their
illegal actions).
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criminal law draws between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
When we do not condemn criminal behavior in the strongest possible
terms, we risk minimizing or, worse, condoning lawlessness.33
The expressive function of the criminal law plays an even more
essential role in the corporate context. First, we confer significant
benefits on corporations with the expectation — indeed, the mandate
— that corporations exist for legal purposes alone. When a corporation
exploits those benefits and violates the public trust by engaging in
illegal conduct, we must make clear that its behavior is unacceptable
and condemn its conduct as criminal. Second, corporations have
outsized power and influence in our society. When a corporation abuses
that power and influence by committing crimes, we must impose blame,
require accountability, and insist upon acceptance of responsibility.
Third, corporations can neither be jailed nor have their individual
liberties restricted when they commit crimes. The distinctive feature of
corporate criminal prosecution is its ability to label corporate
lawlessness as criminal, which is qualitatively different than labeling
misconduct as a civil or administrative violation and critical to assuring
society that corporate criminals are brought to justice.
In this Article, I will offer a more complete account of corporate
criminal liability that incorporates retributive and utilitarian purposes,
while emphasizing the expressive function of the criminal law and the
broader societal values served by corporate criminal prosecution. Part
I will consider the critiques of corporate criminal liability from both
retributive and utilitarian perspectives. I will argue that there are
retributive and utilitarian justifications for corporate criminal liability,
even if those accounts may be incomplete. Part II will explain why the
expressive function of criminal liability, whether viewed as a
standalone proposition or an expansion of retributive and utilitarian
theories, is essential to our understanding of the justification for
corporate criminal liability and punishment. I will suggest that the
expressive value of criminal prosecution — and the societal catharsis
that results — is the most indispensable quality of corporate
prosecution. Part III will address the relationship between the
prosecution of corporations and individuals, with a focus on
corporate-only prosecutions, which some view as a failure of
prosecutorial discretion. Those criticisms are misplaced. Far from
undermining arguments for corporate criminal liability, “corporate

33 Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598
(1996) [hereinafter Alternative Sanctions].
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only” resolutions demonstrate why corporate prosecution plays a
critical role in our criminal justice system.
I.

CRITIQUES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Criminal law theorists focus on retributive and utilitarian
justifications for the imposition of punishment. Retributive theory
focuses on the moral content or wrongfulness of criminal behavior
and justifies punishment based on the “just deserts” of the
defendant.34 As Michael Moore explains, “Retributivism is the view
that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who
receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the
offender deserves it.”35 Utilitarian theory focuses on the societal harm
of criminal behavior and justifies punishment to the extent that it
serves the greater good (i.e. provides societal benefits that exceed the
harm to the defendant).36 A utilitarian punishes to promote
compliance with the law and deter future wrongdoing by the
defendant (specific deterrence) and others who might violate the law
absent the consequences they would face for engaging in similar
misconduct (general deterrence).37
The focus of retributive and utilitarian theory is the punishment of
individuals, specifically how as an ethical matter society can justify the
loss of life or liberty that may accompany criminal punishment. It
therefore is not a surprise that neither theory provides a complete
justification for corporate criminal liability; retributive and utilitarian
theories were not developed with corporations in mind. Neither loss of
life or liberty is at stake when companies are charged criminally,
although the latter may be implicated when corporate officials are
charged.38 Nonetheless, critics of corporate criminal liability rely on
retributive and utilitarian theories to support their claims.
34 Id. at 593 (“The purpose of imprisonment . . . is to make offenders suffer. The
threat of such discomfort is intended to deter criminality, and the imposition of it to
afford a criminal his just deserts.”).
35 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987) (italics omitted).
36 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005)
(describing the purposes and limitations of the utilitarian approach to punishment).
37 See id. at 70 72.
38 Non criminal alternatives are often justified by concerns about collateral
consequences for employees, shareholders, and customers. Claims that criminal
prosecution could result in a “corporate death penalty” have been debunked, however,
since companies almost never fail as a result of criminal prosecution. Gabriel H.
Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate
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In this Part, I will assess the critiques of corporate criminal
prosecution. Analytical fit issues aside, I will suggest that the critiques
miss their mark: there are retributive and utilitarian purposes served
by corporate criminal liability, even if a more complete justification for
corporate criminal liability requires accounting for the expressive
function of criminal punishment, which I will address in Part II.
A. The Retributive Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability
John Coffee’s seminal article “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment 39 is
often cited by critics who argue that corporations should not be
prosecuted criminally because they are not moral actors deserving of
punishment.40 Like many critics of corporate criminal liability,
Professor Coffee worried that corporate penalties would largely be
visited upon innocent third parties, including stockholders,
bondholders, employees who were not involved in the misconduct,
and even customers.41 He also focused extensively on the limits of
corporate criminal liability, arguing that prosecution of corporations
might not deter misconduct by individual employees42 and describing
the “deterrence trap” that results because corporations cannot be

Criminal Convictions in the Twenty First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 827 (2013)
(“No public company convicted in the years 2001 2010 went out of business because
of a federal criminal conviction. This result calls the conventional wisdom about the
Andersen Effect into serious doubt.”).
39 John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981).
40 Examples of this critique include the following: Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient
Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV.
307, 311 12 (1991) (“[E]fforts to stigmatize aggregations of people, most of whom are
blameless, are unjustified in principle . . . .”); Buell, Blaming Function of Entity
Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 475 (“Criminal law scholars have doubted the
doctrine’s theoretical soundness, pointing to illogic in retribution toward objects and
the impossibility of fitting liberal concepts about responsibility with nonhuman
actors. Entity criminal liability, these arguments go, is a purely imputed form of fault
that has little or nothing to do with blameworthiness. And the doctrine is concerned
with the fault of something without free will or character
that is, an apparition with
‘no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked.’”); Khanna, supra note 21, at 1479
80 (“[L]egal thinkers did not believe corporations could possess the moral
blameworthiness necessary to commit crimes of intent.”); John T. Byam, Comment,
The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
582, 583 85 (1982) (arguing that retributive theory is inapplicable in corporate
context because corporations cannot be morally blameworthy).
41 Coffee, supra note 39, at 401 02.
42 Id. at 393.
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jailed and may not have sufficient capitalization to be deterred by
monetary penalties.43
Significantly, however, Professor Coffee did not claim that
corporations should not be prosecuted. Instead, as I do, Professor
Coffee argued that prosecutors should focus both on corporations and
their employees when confronting criminal behavior in the corporate
setting. Coffee explained that “a dual focus on the firm and the
individual is necessary. Neither can be safely ignored.”44 His concern
was that a focus on corporate prosecution, without also pursuing
charges against individuals, would not be sufficient to deter criminal
activity in the corporate setting, and he advocated for the use of
alternative corporate sanctions that might provide more effective
deterrence to corporate actors than pure monetary penalties.45
Nonetheless, even if Professor Coffee were most concerned with the
limitations of corporate criminal liability as a deterrent for
wrongdoing, the retributive critique of corporate liability is well
summarized by his “no soul to damn, no body to kick” moniker. If the
purpose of criminal punishment is to impose sanctions based on the
defendant’s moral culpability, corporations only would be proper
targets of criminal prosecution if they possess moral capacity.
Corporations are persons under the law, which allows them to sue and
be sued and permits the law to treat their conduct as criminal.46 But
corporate personhood is a legal fiction: corporations are artificial,
incorporeal persons with no “minds” of their own and, according to
the retributive critique, no capacity to make moral choices.47 Stated
differently, a corporation does not have moral capacity independent of
the natural persons who are its employees, officers, and board
members — or, in rare cases, own its stock.48
The individuals who work for a company have souls to damn: they
have the mental capacity to choose whether to conform their conduct
to societal norms and the free will to act morally or immorally. We
could ascribe moral culpability to a corporation based on the moral
43

Id. at 390.
Id. at 410.
45 See id. at 413 44 (arguing that equity fines, adverse publicity, integration of
criminal and civil remedies, restitution, and corporate probation would increase
corporate deterrence more effectively than monetary penalties alone).
46 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1362(5) (2012) (including corporations in the definition of
“person” under the Clean Water Act).
47 Byam, supra note 40, at 585 (citation omitted).
48 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19, at 323 (“Corporations are webs of
contractual relationships consisting of individuals who band together for their mutual
economic benefit.”).
44
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culpability of its employees or agents.49 After all, we allow individuals
to act on behalf of the corporation, and we impose criminal liability on
the corporation for the acts of its employees. Yet moral culpability may
not transfer as readily as legal responsibility. We impose vicarious
liability on a corporation based on the acts of an individual employee
or agent, because the employee or agent acts within the scope of her
employment at least in part for the benefit of the corporation.50 Yet
that begs the question of whether we can attach moral culpability to
the corporation based on the acts of that individual employee or agent.
What if every other individual associated with the corporation
ascribed to a different set of moral values? Would we still attribute the
immoral choice of one individual to the entire corporate entity?
Perhaps it would be easier to ascribe moral culpability to a
corporation based on the acts and resulting moral culpability of its
board and its officers. If board members or officers of a company
engage in criminal behavior, it is far easier to attribute their
misconduct to the corporation. After all, they set policies and establish
priorities on behalf of the corporation. Yet if we equate the moral
culpability of board members and officers with the moral culpability of
the corporation, we still are making a moral judgment about other
corporate officials and employees who did not act improperly and may
have had no such moral failings in their conduct. To limit the harmful
effects of criminal punishment to those with moral culpability,
retributivists would limit criminal liability and punishment to
individual corporate officials who engage in wrongdoing and utilize
non-criminal alternatives to penalize corporations.51
To the extent that the retributive critique depends upon the legal
fiction of corporate personhood, Sara Sun Beale responds that
“corporations are not fictions. Rather, they are enormously powerful,
and very real, actors whose conduct often causes very significant harm
both to individuals and to society as a whole.”52 Professor Beale
observes that the power wielded by corporations is “enormous and
unprecedented in human history” and that corporate misconduct —

49 Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 50 (1997) (corporate morality is an extension of the moral
culpability of its human agents and thus corporations may be deserving of
punishment).
50 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909);
United States v. Automated Med. Labs, 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Hilton Hotels, 469 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972).
51 Byam, supra note 40, at 583 85.
52 Beale, supra note 23, at 1482.
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the abuse of corporate power — causes substantial harm to individuals
and society.53 She further explains that “corporations have the ability
to engage in misconduct that dwarfs that which could be
accomplished by individuals.”54
I too have argued that corporations possess an outsized ability to do
both good or harm in our communities.55 We readily embrace the
beneficial actions of corporations, from the production of goods and
employment opportunities, to the innovation and technological
advancement that are powerful drivers in our economy and that can
improve our quality of life. If we recognize the potential of
corporations to make positive contributions to our society, however,
we must acknowledge that their actions can be harmful, and at times
in dramatic ways. “Because of [its] sheer size, a corporate polluter can
cause far more environmental harm than an individual. A company
that makes unsafe products can create far greater public health
risks.”56 Nor are these examples from environmental and consumer
protection law exhaustive. Most corporations strive to meet their legal
obligations and contribute in a positive way in our communities, but
there always will be some companies that break the law and risk or
cause great harm.
Yet even if the conduct of corporations can cause great harm, which
might make their acts deserving of criminal punishment, an answer to
the retributive critique still requires addressing the question of
whether corporations can be morally culpable for their actions. That
question, as it turns out, is not nearly as settled as the retributive
critique suggests. To be sure, there is support for the proposition that
only individuals have the capacity to act intentionally and that
corporations lack the intentionality that provides the basis for moral
capability.57 But there also is support for the contrary view, namely
that corporations have internal decision structures that allow
corporations to act intentionally and therefore morally.58
53

Id. at 1483.
Id. at 1484.
55 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1334.
56 Id.
57 See John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54
MONIST 488, 500 (1970) (arguing that corporations are like machines and thus unable
to comply with principles of morality); Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are
Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 9 (1983)
(claiming that corporations only act through individuals and therefore lack agency).
58 See Denis G. Arnold, Corporate Moral Agency, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 279, 281
(2006) (concluding that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality and thus
are properly understood to be moral agents); Peter A. French, The Corporation as a
54
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The argument that corporations can be moral agents is bolstered by
the extent to which corporations make business decisions guided by
ethical and moral principles. Many businesses adhere to the triplebottom line approach of corporate social responsibility, which
emphasizes people, profits, and planet.59 Corporate advertising extols
virtues such as equal opportunity, maximizing individual potential,
and healing the planet.60 Indeed, we speak often of good companies:
businesses that make quality products and provide quality services to
their customers, treat their employees fairly and compensate them
well, strive to meet or exceed their legal obligations, and contribute
positively in their communities. We also recognize that there are bad
companies: businesses that produce shoddy products, exploit their
workers and the environment, and who place no emphasis on meeting
legal obligations or being good corporate citizens.61 The positive and
negative attributes that we associate with corporations may extend
beyond ethics and morality but that does not alter the fact that there
are good and not-so-good corporate citizens, which reflect underlying
corporate ethics.
It also merits emphasis that corporations, which enjoy legal status
independent of their individual officers and employees, also have
independent corporate cultures.62 Some companies are known for
Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (“[C]orporations can be full fledged
moral persons and have whatever privileges, rights and duties are, in the normal
course of affairs, accorded to moral persons.”).
59 See generally JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS (1999).
60 Super Bowl XLIX in February 2015 featured numerous advertisements that
promoted societal values. See, e.g., Always, Always #LikeAGirl
Super Bowl XLIX,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIxA3o84syY (promoting
gender equality); Microsoft, Microsoft Super Bowl Commercial 2015: Braylon O’Neill,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLXRt qRBfU, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), (promoting
stories of maximizing potential through technology); Microsoft, Microsoft Super Bowl
Commercial 2015: Estella’s Brilliant Bus, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=7cw4jmKQs0E (same); Jeep, Official 2015 Jeep Super Bowl Commercial |
Beautiful Lands | Jeep Renegade, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=j7LbPdzYrrE (promoting environmental awareness and responsibility).
61 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1180 (1991) (“[T]he corporate ethos
test . . . will target only the morally culpable corporation for criminal prosecution.
Thus, the corporations indicted will be the ‘bad’ corporations that have demonstrated
an intent to violate the law.”); Friedman, supra note 28, at 847 (“[W]e tend to speak
of corporations as real entities . . . and to describe their personae as we would an
individual’s personality
as staid or flexible, welcoming or cold, even good or bad”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
62 See generally Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law, or: A Black
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going “beyond compliance” in conducting their business affairs, while
companies that break the law often are criticized for their poor
compliance cultures. To be sure, those positive and negative
compliance cultures — as well as the corporate culture in matters
ranging from human resources to community engagement — are
shaped by corporate leadership. Yet corporate cultures persist despite
management changes and influence behavior of individuals within
those corporations, much as corporate priorities often endure over
time and affect how individuals within the corporation behave. If
corporate cultures are ontologically distinct and influential, it would
follow that corporations have agency and moral culpability distinct
from that possessed by individuals within the company, in which case
the retributive critique loses much of its force.
Of course, ethical and moral behavior of corporations exists on a
continuum, much as it does for individuals. A corporation could
engage in wrongdoing, whether because its management fails to
devote sufficient resources to compliance or because its employees
have not been trained sufficiently. The company may be a good
company that has engaged in misconduct, much the same as an
individual may have a moral lapse and engage in conduct that is not
typical of her behavior. Prosecutors might exercise discretion and
decline to charge aberrational behavior, and we might expect greater
leniency in the face of isolated misconduct than for a pattern of
misconduct.
But how prosecutors exercise their discretion with regard to
corporate misconduct — and the degree to which they might find the
underlying acts deserving of punishment — is a different question
from whether corporations are morally culpable. Individuals do not
have to be immoral in all of their actions to be morally culpable for
their misconduct. Likewise, a corporation does not have to be immoral
in all of its actions for it to be morally culpable for its misconduct.
Under a retributive approach we properly focus on the defendant’s
moral culpability for the criminal act; we do not excuse or mitigate
conduct if the defendant is otherwise morally upright. Even a
corporation that is law-abiding in most other respects could be
morally culpable for its crimes, if we accept the proposition that
corporations have decision-making capacities and identities distinct
from their individual agents.63
Corporation, a Christian Corporation, and a Maori Corporation Walk into a Bar . . ., 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353 (2016).
63 An alternative view is that corporations are deserving of blame from a
retributivist perspective, even if we cannot resolve the debate about their moral
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B. The Utilitarian Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability
My colleague Vic Khanna provides a classic utilitarian critique of
corporate criminal liability in his article Corporate Criminal Liability:
What Purpose Does It Serve?64 Professor Khanna argues that corporate
criminal liability emerged as a vicarious liability doctrine in the early
1900s because civil penalties were not available to address corporate
misconduct.65 His claim draws support from the Supreme Court
decision in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United
States,66 which rejected claims that corporations should not be
immune from criminal prosecution because doing so “would virtually
take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter
[interstate commercial transactions] and correcting the abuses aimed
at [it].”67 Of course, with the expansion of civil enforcement regimes
in the intervening decades, there now are other ways to effectually
control wrongful business practices.68
Professor Khanna therefore asks whether civil penalties can provide
the same utilitarian benefits as criminal penalties and at a lower cost to
society. Utilitarian goals of punishment include incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation of criminal defendants.69 Incapacitation
is not applicable in the corporate context, since it involves the
incarceration of defendants to protect the public from harm, which is
not an option for corporate defendants. Deterrence and rehabilitation
both can be achieved by corporate criminal prosecution — deterrence
by creating incentives for corporations to comply with the law and
making it more costly to violate the law; rehabilitation by mandating
corporate structural reforms, including corporate compliance
programs, as terms of probation.70 Professor Khanna focuses on
agency, because corporate crime evinces a failure of corporate management regardless
of whether they are involved in the wrongdoing. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by
Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 411, 451 (2012) [hereinafter Guilty by Proxy].
64 Khanna, supra note 21, at 1478.
65 Id. at 1485 86.
66 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
67 Id. at 496.
68 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (c) (2012) (establishing criminal, civil, and
administrative penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act).
69 See Frase, supra note 36, at 70.
70 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 890 91
(2007) (describing DOJ’s goal of using prosecution to increase compliance, change
corporate culture, and spur other structural reforms); Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra
note 29, at 1448 52 (describing the deterrent effects of corporate criminal prosecution
in the context of oil and drilling companies).
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deterrence and whether civil penalties might be just as effective as
criminal penalties in promoting compliance and preventing
violations.71
Under the economic approach that Professor Khanna supports,
crime will be deterred efficiently if penalties are set at levels high
enough to discourage unlawful behavior even when discounted for the
likelihood that the violation will be detected by the government.72
Since the likelihood of detection is less than 100%, penalties must be
correspondingly greater than the cost of compliance.73 Otherwise, the
rational economic actor might be better off saving money on
compliance, especially when the risk of being caught if violations
occur is low. But penalties cannot be set too high, particularly in a
legal regime with vicarious liability, or socially desirable business
activity will be chilled.74 If penalties are properly calibrated in this
fashion, optimal deterrence should result.75
Professor Khanna considers monetary and reputational penalties as
the primary tools for achieving optimal deterrence. Standing alone,
civil fines and criminal fines offer the same deterrence inasmuch as
they are monetized and reduced to the same degree by the applicable
risk of detection. Professor Khanna acknowledges that the reputational
harm of criminal penalties arguably might be greater than the stigma
attached to civil penalties.76 Professor Khanna argues that monetary
penalties are a more precise and efficient penalty, however, since we
have no ability to determine accurately how much reputational
71

See Khanna, supra note 21, at 1493 94.
Accord Arlen, supra note 22, at 834 (discussing how the economic approach of
corporate criminal liability sanctions the wrongdoer to deter crime); see Khanna, supra
note 21, at 1533 (“A desirable system should permit the imposition of cash fines and
supplementary sanctions, such as equity fines or a loss of license, when cash fines are
insufficient.”).
73 As previously noted, environmental crimes are the largest area of corporate
criminal prosecution based on number of convictions. Garrett, Globalized Corporate
Prosecutions, supra note 10, at 1873. Yet the United States Environmental Protection
Agency has only 200 special agents, which makes it impossible to investigate all
instances of environmental violations that might warrant criminal enforcement.
74 See Khanna, supra note 21, at 1514 16 (“[T]he possibility of a severe sanction
under an uncertain legal standard may chill desirable behavior . . . .”); cf. Arlen, supra
note 22 at 835 36, 843 (arguing that a strict vicarious liability regime may chill
corporate detection and enforcement expenditures).
75 See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 19, at 342 43 (claiming that “nothing was
gained by prosecuting Exxon criminally” for the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and that
“[c]ivil penalties against Exxon levied through the tort system were sufficient to
achieve optimal deterrence”).
76 Khanna, supra note 21, at 1508 09.
72
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damage will occur based on a criminal prosecution, conviction, and
sentence.77 And, according to Professor Khanna, no one benefits from
the reputational damage to a corporation, in contrast to a fine that can
be used by the government for future enforcement efforts or other
societal benefits.78 He therefore claims that a properly calibrated civil
enforcement regime is preferable to criminal liability at least to the
extent that deterrence is the objective.79
If one accepts the view that reputational harm and other nonmonetary sanctions can be monetized, Professor Khanna might be
right that the deterrent value of civil penalties could equal the
deterrent value of criminal penalties. Courts could increase the
applicable civil fine by whatever amount were necessary to account for
the reduced reputational damage and arrive at an enhanced civil fine
that would have an equivalent deterrent effect as the criminal penalty.
Yet, putting aside for now the question of whether the expressive
value of criminal prosecution would warrant criminal liability — a
view that Professor Khanna rejects — there are at least three
challenges to relying solely on civil enforcement.80
First, civil penalties will only deter to the same degree as criminal
penalties if civil penalties are at least as great if not larger than criminal
penalties. As a theoretical matter, this might not be a challenge; as a
practical matter, it could be insurmountable. In some areas of the law,
civil penalties are comparable to potential criminal penalties. For
example, although financial institutions were not prosecuted criminally
for their roles in the financial crisis, JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup
both paid multi-billion dollar civil penalties for their misconduct.81 In
the Gulf oil spill, BP paid $20.8 billion to resolve civil claims —
including $5.5 billion in civil penalties — amounts that exceed the $4.5
billion the company paid in criminal penalties.82
77 Id. at 1503 04 (“[W]e should prefer cash fines over reputational sanctions as
long as the corporation is not judgment proof.”).
78 Id. at 1503.
79 Id. at 1511.
80 See infra Part II for a discussion of the expressive value of corporate criminal
prosecution.
81 Devlin Barrett & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan, U.S. Settle for $13
Billion, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304439804579207701974094982; Andrew Grossman & Christina
Rexrode, Citigroup to Pay $7 Billion in Mortgage Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup to pay 7 billion to resolve mortgage probe
1405335864.
82 Kevin McGill, US Judge OKs $20B Settlement from 2010 BP Oil Spill, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Apr. 4, 2016), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/062ee20eed004fcf94f151f5fb29b8e7/us
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Yet criminal penalties can be as much as twice the gain or loss
associated with a criminal offense,83 which often would far exceed the
available civil penalties. In the Gulf oil spill example, the maximum
criminal penalty was more than $40 billion based on the economic
losses and natural resource damages associated with the spill.84 The
maximum civil penalty for BP was $13 billion — and for other
companies was far lower. For worker safety, mine safety, consumer
protection, food and drug, and wildlife violations, criminal penalties
dwarf what would be available under civil penalty regimes.85 Of
course, Congress could address these disparities, but it has not done
so in the worker safety context for decades86 — and there are no civil
penalties for arguably the oldest wildlife protection law, the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act.87
Second, it may be a mistake to assume that reputational harm can be
monetized and imposed instead as monetary fines. To the extent that
lost business results, it might theoretically be possible to know ex ante
the amount of those losses. In reality, it would almost never be
judge oks 20b settlement 2010 bp oil spill 0; Steven Mufson, BP Settlement Will Cost $20.8
Billion, Justice Department Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/bp settlement will cost 208 billion justice department says/2015/
10/05/abb82b1e 6b78 11e5 b31c d80d62b53e28 story.html. BP previously paid $4 billion
in criminal penalties to resolve Clean Water Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, manslaughter,
and false statement charges based on the spill; the company paid an additional $500
million to address securities violations. Judgment, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod.
Inc., No 2:12 CR 00292 (E.D. La. 2013).
83 See Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2012).
84 BP has paid approximately $14.7 billion in economic losses and agreed to pay nearly
$8 billion in natural resource damages. See Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Claims and Other
Payments, Public Report, BRIT. PETROLEUM (July 31, 2015), http://www.bp.
com/content/dam/bp country/en us/PDF/GOM/Public Report July 2015.pdf
(regarding
economic losses); Campbell Robertson, John Schwartz & Richard Pérez Peña, $18.7 Billion
Deal Reached with BP in Gulf Oils Spill, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/us/bp to pay gulf coast states 18 7 billion for
deepwater horizon oil spill.html? r=0 (regarding natural resource damages).
85 See, e.g., Mine, Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820 (2012) (addressing mine
safety); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136l (2012)
(covering food and drug violation penalties); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1540 (2012) (protecting wildlife); see also David M. Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker
Endangerment: The Need for Stronger Criminal Penalties for Violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS, Spring 2009, at 191,
195 96 [hereinafter Prosecuting Worker Endangerment] (stating that criminal penalties
can be much higher than administrative penalties under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act).
86 See Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 201 (showing
that criminal provisions of worker safety laws have not been amended since 1970s).
87 See 16 U.S.C. § 707 (2012).
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possible to predict lost business from reputational damage — and,
given the number of factors that can contribute to lower revenues, it
may not even be possible to assess reputational harm after the fact.88
For example, there is anecdotal evidence that consumers avoided
using Exxon and BP gas stations after their oil spills but that their
reluctance was not widespread, at least in part because “boycotts” are
more likely to affect independent franchisees than oil producers.89 On
the other hand, the Volkswagen emissions scandal, at least for now,
appears to have alienated some customers permanently.90
Moreover, prospective uncertainty about how much lost business
will occur has a deterrent value that a fixed penalty cannot provide. If
a company has few competitors and inelastic demand for its product
or services, lost business may be limited. In a competitive marketplace,
however, and particularly one where demand for a company’s product
or services is elastic, lost business could be substantial. In those
circumstances, corporations might seek to avoid the reputational harm
of a criminal conviction in part because it is hard to know how much
lost business would occur as a result.91
An economist might protest that uncertainty about reputational
harm and resulting lost business leads to inefficient allocation of
resources, since companies cannot determine what sanction they will
face if they commit violations and are prosecuted. Yet that is precisely
why reputational harm is a powerful deterrent. Just as we are more
likely to comply with the law when we are afraid of getting caught —
like when we are careful about our speed because there might be a
speed trap ahead — we are more likely to avoid violations when we
are uncertain about how large any resulting penalties will be. When
we are certain about the likelihood of detection and amount of
punishment, the sanction becomes a price and loses deterrent value,
88 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 510 12
(describing the many variables influencing reputational effect).
89 See Kate Sheppard, Should You Boycott BP?, MOTHER JONES (June 14, 2010),
http://www.motherjones.com/blue marble/2010/06/should you boycott bp.
90 See, e.g., Richard Conniff, Revenge of the Jetta, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2015, at SR5.
91 In the Volkswagen example, it remains to be seen how much the emissions
scandal will hurt sales. The company reported a 2% decline in sales for 2015, at least
some of which was attributable to the emissions scandal. See David McHugh, German
Automaker Volkswagen Says Global Sales Fell 2 Percent Last Year Amidst Emissions
Scandal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.usnews.
com/news/business/articles/2016 01 08/scandal hit volkswagen brand sees 2015 sales
fall 48 pct. The extent to which sales rebound in 2016 and beyond will depend upon
many variables, including the company’s ability to recall and retrofit affected vehicles and
whether lost sales are limited to VW vehicles or spread to other Volkswagen brands.

1256

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 49:1235

which is particularly problematic in the criminal context where the
optimal societal outcome is that no crime occurs.
Third, criminal enforcement may have the ability to change the
culture of organizations in ways that civil penalties cannot. The stigma
of a criminal conviction extends beyond reputational harm in the
marketplace; it also extends to the internal dynamics of a corporation.
I would suggest that criminal prosecution may have an effect in the
board room and in the corporate suite in ways that civil enforcement
does not.92 There are numerous examples of companies that paid civil
penalties and continued to have compliance problems — until they
were criminally prosecuted and then made far greater efforts to
comply with the law. One example is the pipe manufacturing
company McWane, Inc., which committed egregious worker safety
and environmental violations for years, even after incurring civil
penalties for its infractions, until it was prosecuted at five separate
facilities and forced to pay more than $25 million in criminal fines and
penalties.93 Since the prosecution, McWane has invested extensive
resources in worker safety and environmental compliance.94 Another
example is Central Industries, which committed approximately 1114
permit violations, exceeding pollutant limitations in the company’s
Clean Water Act permit by hundreds of percentage points and its
authorized flow rate by millions of gallons.95 Its misconduct continued
for more than a decade, even though the company faced civil

92 Indeed, impacts may extend to lower level managers as well. Sally S. Simpson et
al., An Empirical Assessment of Corporate Environmental Crime Control Strategies, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231, 239 (2013) (“Although the literature is slim and
contradictory, there is evidence that firm level stigmatic consequences trickle down to
responsible managers.”); see Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational
Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 523 (1999); Jonathan M.
Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 581, 605 07 (2008) (discussing reputational penalties’ effects on
corporations).
93 See Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 196 97
(describing the investigation of McWane and the subsequent pleas and fines).
Numerous individuals also were prosecuted for crimes at three of the facilities where
McWane faced criminal charges. Id. at 197.
94 See A Dangerous Business Revisited, FRONTLINE (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/mcwane/etc/synopsis.html; McWane, EPA in Landmark
Environmental Settlement, FOUNDRY MAG. (July 14, 2010), http://foundrymag.com/
meltpour/mcwane epa landmark environmental settlement.
95 United States v. Cent. Indus., Inc., No. 3:00CR18WS (S.D. Miss. 2000); see
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Central Industries, Inc. Pleads Guilty to 26 Felony
Violations in Mississippi Water Pollution Case (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Central
Industries Press Release], available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0uorDgBoVB1.
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penalties, until the company was prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and paid
a $13 million criminal fine and $1 million in restitution.96
Criminal prosecution also may affect employee morale, retention,
and recruitment in ways that civil penalties do not. While fines under
criminal and civil regimes could be equalized, at least in theory, it is
far less clear that a civil enforcement action could ever focus board,
management, and employee attention on compliance to the same
extent that criminal prosecution does. Criminal and civil enforcement
are different in kind and different in their effects. Much as the societal
message is different, as I discuss in Part II, the impact within a
company and the resulting deterrence may be different, at least for
specific deterrence of that company.
Other distinctions between criminal and civil enforcement may
further increase the deterrent effects of corporate criminal liability.
When companies plead guilty in criminal cases, as most corporate
defendants do, they must admit their wrongdoing,97 which in many
cases requires a senior corporate official to appear in court and admit
to the company’s misconduct. Civil settlements sometimes require
similar admissions — most notably in some Securities and Exchange
Commission actions — but the majority of civil settlements stipulate
that the defendant “neither admits nor denies” wrongdoing.98 In
addition to requiring greater accountability, as I discuss in Part II,
admissions of wrongdoing — like the stigma of criminal conviction
and punishment — may also focus companies on compliance more
than civil settlements.99
Finally, criminal convictions have collateral consequences that
increase their deterrent value. Perhaps the best-known example is the
automatic disqualification for banks and other financial institutions
that issue securities, which purportedly was the basis for deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution of banks until the government
96

Central Industries Press Release, supra note 95.
Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, supra note 10, at 1804 n.112 (noting
that, in accordance with the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations § 9 28.1300, a corporation must provide enough facts showing its guilt
when pleading guilty to prevent future assertions of innocence).
98 See Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 515 17 (2013) (describing how failing to
require corporations to admit wrongdoing in civil settlements “squanders” the
deterrence benefits of enforcement).
99 Admissions of wrongdoing also may increase the deterrent effects of criminal
punishment, since corporations are collaterally estopped from denying the underlying
conduct in any related civil lawsuits (and therefore may be more likely to incur
liability and damages in those suits). See id. at 512.
97
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decided to grant waivers.100 Companies that are convicted of criminal
violations also may face suspension or debarment from government
contracting. For example, some environmental crimes, such as
convictions under the Clean Water Act, impose mandatory loss of
government contracts.101 Suspension and debarment is not part of the
punishment for criminal violations; rather it serves remedial purposes.
Companies are prohibited from entering new contracts with the
government until they address the conditions that gave rise to their
conviction.102 In the typical case, that means negotiating with the
government over the terms of a compliance program that will prevent
future violations. No suspension and debarment authority exists for
civil violations nor would it be practical for civil violations to trigger
loss of government contracting given the much larger number of civil
violations that occur across all regulatory programs.
What emerges from this analysis is the view that criminal penalties
are different than civil penalties, if not in the fines that they produce
(which, at least in theory, could be equalized) but in the effect they
have on organizations, the accountability they require, and the
collateral consequences that result. Prosecutors must use care in how
they impose criminal sanctions: as Jennifer Arlen notes, there are
circumstances where the prospect of criminal prosecution reduces
incentives for companies to audit their activities and correct and selfreport violations.103 In addition, there may be circumstances where
criminal sanctions would cause harm to innocent third parties, such as
the Wake Med case in North Carolina where criminal prosecution of a
rural hospital would have jeopardized access to health care for elderly
and poor residents who depended upon Medicare and Medicaid
benefits.104 But the utilitarian critique of corporate criminal liability
100 Banks that commit criminal violations are ineligible issuers under Rule 405 of
the Securities Act of 1933. JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Barclays, and Royal Bank of
Scotland received disqualification waivers when they agreed to plead guilty to
currency manipulation. See Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Banks Admit Scheme to
Rig Currency Price, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2015, at A1.
101 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2012) (prohibiting federal agencies from contracting with
any person convicted under the Clean Water Act “until the [EPA] Administrator
certifies that the condition giving rise to such conviction has been corrected”).
102 Id.
103 Arlen, supra note 22, at 835 36, 843, 848.
104 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1321 22.
Collateral consequences to innocent third parties are the primary justification offered
by the Justice Department for entering deferred prosecution and non prosecution
agreements instead of seeking criminal convictions. Id. at 1320. But the Justice
Department has not required its prosecutors to demonstrate that collateral
consequences are present
nor is there empirical evidence that significant collateral
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fails on its own terms. Deterrence is central to utilitarian theories of
criminal punishment — and deterrence is greater when a company
may be criminally liable for egregious misconduct, along with the
corporate officials who may be liable as individuals.
II.

THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION

Fifty years ago, Joel Feinberg wrote that criminal punishment was
different from other kinds of penalties because of the “symbolic
significance” of the criminal sanction.105 Professor Feinberg did not
purport to be the first scholar to focus on the expressive function of
punishment. Other moral philosophers, most notably Henry M. Hart,
claimed that community condemnation was an essential feature of
criminal punishment.106 As Professor Hart explained:
What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that
distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies . . . its imposition. . . . [A
crime] is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place,
will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral
condemnation of the community.107
Professor Feinberg went further than Professor Hart and argued that
condemnation involved not only an expression of disapproval but also
an expression of societal resentment.108 He explained that society must
express its disavowal of criminal conduct, make clear its nonacquiescence in impermissible behavior, vindicate the rule of law, and
absolve the innocent.109
Scholars disagree about whether expressive theory is an
independent justification for criminal punishment or merely a
restatement of aspects of retributive or utilitarian theories.110 To the
extent that condemnation reflects a societal judgment about the
wrongfulness of behavior, expressive theory has a retributive quality.
Societal condemnation also may have deterrent effects, inasmuch as
consequences have been avoided. See id. at 1322.
105 Feinberg, supra note 30, at 400.
106 See id. at 401 (acknowledging the legal community’s general acceptance of the
idea that community condemnation is essential for punishment).
107 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404 05 (1958) (quoted in Feinberg, supra note 30, at 401).
108 Feinberg, supra note 30, at 403.
109 Id. at 404 08.
110 See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 33, at 601.
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defendants would want to avoid the associated stigma, which suggests
a utilitarian quality. On the other hand, there is a degree to which
both retributive and utilitarian theory are focused on the defendant’s
behavior and not on the societal messaging that accompanies criminal
prosecution, which might indicate that expressive theory is a
standalone justification for criminal liability and punishment.
My goal here is not to resolve the question of whether expressive
theory is an independent justification for criminal punishment. Instead,
I want to focus on how the values associated with expressive theory
resonate in the analysis of the role of corporate criminal prosecution. I
hope to expand understanding of the expressive function of corporate
criminal prosecution beyond the concept of societal condemnation of
the defendant, although I agree that is a key attribute of the expressive
function. Criminal prosecution of corporations also reflects the societal
imperative to respond to illegal behavior in a way that upholds the rule
of law, reinforces core societal values, provides accountability, and
ensures that justice has been done.
In this Part, I consider corporate criminal prosecution from an
expressive perspective.111 First, I assess the degree to which corporate
criminal liability involves line-drawing and norm-setting that is
essential to upholding the rule of law and validates the choices of
companies who meet their legal obligations. Second, I analyze societal
condemnation as a sanction for unlawful behavior and how the stigma
or shame that accompanies criminal punishment is particularly
significant in the corporate context. Third, I address how
accountability and the sense that justice has been done is necessary in
the face of corporate wrongdoing — and how corporate criminal
prosecution promotes the societal catharsis that must take place for us
to move beyond the harmful effects of wrongdoing.
A. The Line-Drawing and Norm-Setting Functions of Corporate
Criminal Liability
A central purpose of the criminal law is the expression of societal
values about what conduct will not be tolerated.112 The criminal law
111 I will use the term “corporate criminal prosecution” to describe both corporate
criminal liability and corporate criminal punishment. I refer to “corporate criminal
liability” as the corporate misconduct that gives rise to criminal liability, which we
might think of as a definitional question of what conduct is criminalized. I refer to
“corporate criminal punishment” as the sanction we impose when corporate criminal
liability is present. The two are related but analytically distinct concepts.
112 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 842 43 (“Criminal liability in turn expresses the
community’s condemnation of the wrongdoer’s conduct by emphasizing the standards
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performs this line-drawing function by delineating what conduct will
give rise to criminal liability — and then reinforces the message by
authorizing criminal punishment. In some instances, the criminal law
sets a boundary between lawful and unlawful conduct. Bank robbery
and kidnapping are crimes; there are no circumstances where robbing
a bank or kidnapping another person involves lawful conduct. In
other instances, the criminal law sets a boundary between types of
unlawful conduct. It is unlawful to drive over the speed limit;
speeding becomes criminal when it recklessly endangers others or if a
death occurs because of the driver’s negligent speeding.
The criminal law is not the only way that the law expresses societal
values and demarcates between lawful and unlawful conduct. Civil
laws also perform line-drawing functions that express societal values.
For example, anti-discrimination laws prohibit employment
discrimination based on race or gender, which helps ensure that all
people are treated equally in employment decisions.113 Discrimination
based on race or gender offends core societal values and, if proven, can
result in substantial civil liabilities. We reserve criminal liability,
however, for misconduct that is more egregious or is committed with a
more culpable mental state — or both. If the same discriminatory
animus results in intentionally causing bodily injury to another
person, it becomes a hate crime and subjects the defendant to criminal
prosecution.114 Both civil and criminal violations involve unlawful
conduct, but criminal violations are qualitatively different or worse. As
John Diamond explains, “what is criminally wrong and right must be
something more than what is merely civilly wrong and right.”115
Corporate criminal liability provides the same line-drawing function
as the criminal law does in other contexts. A broad array of rules
governs the activities of corporations, including but not limited to
labor, consumer safety, environmental, antitrust, securities, and tax
laws. We expect companies to comply with all of these laws, and we
may impose civil liability when they fail to meet their obligations. But
for appropriate behavior
that is, the standards by which persons and goods
properly should be valued.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 362 (1997) (arguing that positions that the criminal law
takes are “suffused with meaning” about “what kind of life the community views as
virtuous”).
113 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 2000e 17
(2012) (prohibiting employer discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, national
origin, and religion).
114 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012) (criminalizing certain offenses involving actual or
perceived race, color, religion, or national origin).
115 Diamond, Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, supra note 31, at 309.
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some violations are more serious than others, not just in degree but in
kind, which we express by imposing criminal liability. As a normative
matter, we reserve criminal liability for the most egregious corporate
misconduct, to express the societal view about what corporate
behavior will not be tolerated under any circumstances.116
Of course, the normative proposition that we reserve corporate
criminal liability for egregious violations may or may not be
descriptive. There is substantial debate about whether we criminalize
too much conduct in the United States, particularly in the regulatory
context where most corporate crime occurs.117 On the other hand,
there also are instances where our laws contain inadequate criminal
provisions, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act,118 which
makes it a crime to commit a worker safety violation only if the
defendant acts willfully and an employee dies.119 Knowing violations
that result in death or willful violations that result in serious injuries
only give rise to civil penalties.120 Resolving questions about what
corporate misconduct should be criminalized is beyond the scope of
this article, but the expressive function of corporate criminal liability
highlights the need for criminal sanctions to focus on corporate

116

See id.
The House Judiciary Committee created a bipartisan task force on over
criminalization in May 2013. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, House
Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over Criminalization
(May 5, 2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/5/
housejudiciarycommitteecreatesbipartisantaskforceonovercriminalization. The task
force was reauthorized in February 2014. Press Release, U.S. House of
Representatives, House Judiciary Committee Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over
Criminalization Task Force (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/index.cfm/2014/2/house judiciary committee reauthorizes bipartisan over
criminalization task force. See also Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 712 (2005) (arguing that the government readily misuses crime
and punishment); Paul S. Rosenzweig, The Over Criminalization of Social and Economic
Conduct, 7 HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Apr. 17, 2003, at 8 12 (arguing that
criminal law today punishes those who have no bad intent or actual knowledge of the
law); cf. John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 112 (1996) (“[C]riminal law groups selective samples of the
reprehensible with the innocent and effectively condemns both.”); Stuart P. Green,
Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997) (describing the
increased use of criminal law in regulatory offenses and the potentially negative
consequences).
118 Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 678 (2012).
119 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
120 Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 195 96.
117
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misconduct that is most egregious and warrants the strongest possible
societal response.
The criminal law is our most powerful tool for expressing what
conduct is outside the bounds of acceptable corporate behavior —
what I have referred to as the line-drawing function of corporate
criminal liability. The criminal law also is our most powerful tool for
expressing how we expect corporations to conduct their affairs —
what I call the norm-setting function of corporate criminal liability.
The criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act provide an example of
both functions.121 The Clean Water Act requires facilities that
discharge pollutants into waters of the United States to obtain
permits.122 Facilities must self-monitor their compliance with permit
limits and submit discharge monitoring reports to the government.123
When the reports contain accurate information, regulators have
reliable information about pollution activity and are better able to
ensure that state water quality standards are satisfied. When the
reports contain false information, the self-monitoring system created
by the Clean Water Act is undermined and harmful pollution may go
undetected. Criminal prosecution of corporations that submit false
reports makes clear that it is unacceptable to mislead regulators about
permit compliance — and reinforces the norm that companies are
expected to be truthful in their communications with the government.
Corporate criminal liability thus becomes an essential tool for
upholding the rule of law and reinforcing societal norms. We
repudiate the choices made by companies who violate the law and
ensure both that they do not profit from their misconduct but also that
they cannot treat any resulting penalties as merely a “cost of doing
business” (i.e. paying a price or fee to engage in the conduct). We
validate the choices made by law-abiding companies, who must
commit substantial resources to meet their legal obligations and
should not be at a competitive disadvantage with companies who
break the law.
Conversely, when we do not impose criminal liability upon
corporations that commit egregious violations of the law, we blur the
lines that the criminal law establishes between conduct that is
121

33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2012).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344 (2012).
123 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2012) (requiring point source polluters to maintain records,
make reports, and monitor their discharges); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j) (2015)
(promulgating regulations for permittees to retain records that must include certain
requirements); 40 C.F.R. § 122.48 (2015) (requiring permits to specify the proper
monitoring equipment, monitoring type, and reporting requirements).
122
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acceptable and conduct that will not be tolerated. We express to the
companies that break the law that their conduct is not so egregious that
it warrants criminal prosecution. We tell companies that are diligent
about meeting legal obligations that their efforts are valued less by
society. In the process, we weaken adherence to the rule of law and our
ability to send societal messages about what corporate behavior is
unacceptable and what corporate behavior we want to promote.
B. Societal Condemnation of Corporate Criminal Punishment
Corporate criminal liability expresses societal values about what
corporate conduct to promote and what corporate conduct will not be
tolerated. For the norm-setting and line-drawing of corporate criminal
liability to be more than aspirational, however, criminal punishment
must ensue when corporations commit egregious violations of the law.
The societal condemnation that is expressed by criminal punishment
is both the distinctive feature of the criminal sanction — as Professors
Hart and Feinberg recognized124 — as well as the criminal law’s
unique tool for censuring corporate misconduct. We cannot jail a
corporation, but we can condemn its conduct by treating it as criminal
and imposing criminal punishment on the corporation.
The societal condemnation that accompanies corporate criminal
punishment serves multiple purposes. First, societal condemnation
offers a targeted, defendant-specific repudiation of the corporation’s
misconduct. Corporate criminal liability expresses societal values
about what corporate conduct is unacceptable by prospectively
defining certain categories of conduct as criminal. Corporate criminal
punishment expresses societal views about the unacceptable conduct
of a specific corporation by retrospectively condemning the criminal
activity of the corporation. The laws defining corporate conduct as
criminal have little meaning without the subsequent punishment of
corporate defendants who violate the laws — and the accompanying
societal condemnation of their misconduct.
Second, societal condemnation of corporate criminal behavior is a
powerful sanction for the corporation. The labeling of corporate
misconduct as criminal sullies the corporation’s reputation as a lawabiding and ethical corporation. The company may lose business as a
result, as discussed in Part I, but reputational harm is a broader
sanction than lost business. Reputational harm can discourage
investment in a company and make it more difficult to recruit and
retain valued employees. Reputational harm also can hamper
124

See supra notes 105 07 and accompanying text.
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relationships in the broader business community.125 Fines and lost
business can be internalized by a corporation and may be viewed
within the company — and by society — as a price for engaging in
misconduct. Societal condemnation and the resulting reputational
harm are sanctions that cannot be fully monetized and therefore can
have more enduring effects.
Whether reputational harm persists for a long time or dissipates
quickly will vary depending on the corporation involved and the
nature of its misconduct. To some extent, the duration of the stigma of
criminal prosecution will depend upon factors within the
corporation’s control, including the degree to which the corporation
expresses remorse and takes steps to improve its compliance efforts.
Stigma may nonetheless endure based on factors beyond the
corporation’s control, such as public perceptions of the wrongdoing
and the extent to which corporate values are seen as the culprit.126 In
the interim, the reputational harm of criminal prosecution can be
significant for corporate management and employees.127 As noted in
Part I, corporate officers must account to board members and
shareholders about why the corporation engaged in criminal
misconduct;128 corporate employees must endure the ignominy of
working for a corporation condemned as criminal.
Third, societal condemnation of corporate criminal behavior
imposes blame on the corporations where misconduct occurs. Samuel
Buell argues that the blaming function of what he terms “entity
criminal liability” represents its central function.129 He observes that,
as a matter of social psychology, organizations often influence
individuals within their midst and therefore corporations (or
corporate culture) often may be responsible for misconduct carried
125 But see Khanna, supra note 21, at 1500 12 (analyzing reputational sanctions and
concluding such sanctions are “rarely socially desirable in the corporate context”).
126 See supra notes 89 91 and accompanying text.
127 See generally Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25
(discussing how constituents, consumers, and audiences take criminal sanctions
seriously and find reputational effects very important).
128 BP chief executive officer Tony Hayward resigned in the wake of the Gulf oil
spill. Eduard Gismatullin & Brian Swint, BP’s Hayward Quits After Spill Shreds Pledge
to Improve Safety, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2010 07 27/hayward s resignation inevitable after bp spill undermined safety
pledge. Volkswagen CEO Martin Winterkorn suffered a similar fate because of the VW
emissions debacle. Jack Ewing, Rigged Testing by Volkswagen Fells Its C.E.O., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, at A1.
129 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 477
(“[T]he blaming function of entity criminal liability is linked closely to the utility of
the doctrine.”).
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out by individuals within the corporation.130 When that relationship is
present, Professor Buell proposes that it is proper to blame the
corporation for criminal activity.131 He suggests that his proposal has
retributive qualities, inasmuch as the corporation is deserving of
sanction, and utilitarian benefits, because affixing blame on the
organization may lead to changes that will prevent future wrongdoing
— and may motivate other corporations to take steps to improve their
corporate cultures.132
I agree with Professor Buell that the blaming function of corporate
criminal prosecution is an effective expressive tool that vindicates
societal interests in condemning wrongdoing. I also agree that there
may be deterrent effects from imposing blame. To the extent that the
corporation is to blame for the criminal wrongdoing of its employees
— either because it condones misconduct or increases the likelihood
that violations will occur because of insufficient compliance efforts
and/or inadequate training — societal condemnation is appropriate. In
my experience, as Professor Buell suggests, most corporate crimes are
attributable to a poor compliance culture.133
Of course, if societal condemnation has substantial expressive
benefits, it follows that when corporate wrongdoing occurs and is not
prosecuted criminally there may be significant expressive costs.134 As I
have argued elsewhere, when we sanction corporate misconduct with
a deferred prosecution or civil penalties that do not involve the same
degree of societal condemnation, we minimize corporate misconduct
and may risk condoning it.135 When criminal sanctions are not sought,
we express a societal judgment that the conduct is less egregious.
“[W]hen society deliberately foregoes answering the wrongdoer
130 Id. at 493 97 (describing how institutions shape behavior); see also Bucy, supra
note 61, at 1127 (concluding that “(1) each corporation is distinctive and draws its
uniqueness from a complex combination of formal and informal factors; (2) the
formal and informal structure of a corporation can promote, or discourage, violations
of the law; and (3) this structure is identifiable, observable, and malleable”).
131 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 497
(“[O]ur blaming practice is rooted in the reality that, in the modern world,
organizations do influence behavior.”).
132 Id. at 516 22 (discussing retribution); id. at 500 12 (discussing deterrence).
133 There is at least some empirical research to support these views. “Evidence
suggests that managers who believe that the corporate culture is tolerant of illegality
are more likely to violate regulations.” Simpson et al., supra note 92, at 238.
134 See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 49 51 (2012) (discussing how failure to impose criminal liability on
corporations “risks sending the signal that criminal conduct will be punished
except where it is committed by a corporation”).
135 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1336.
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through punishment, it risks being perceived as endorsing his
valuations [and misconduct].”136 Non-criminal alternatives also
express to those affected by the misconduct that any harm they
suffered is less significant. Resulting cynicism about whether
corporations are above the law erodes public confidence in our
criminal justice system and thus compounds the harm wrought by
corporate misconduct.
C. Societal Catharsis of Corporate Criminal Prosecution
Prior expressive accounts have focused to varying degrees on the
normative role of corporate criminal liability and the stigma of societal
condemnation — but not on how the presence or absence of corporate
responsibility affects public perceptions of corporate misconduct and
the fairness of the criminal justice system. I would argue that criminal
prosecution of corporate misconduct is necessary to maintain public
trust and to ensure that the criminal justice system promotes fairness
even when misconduct involves the most powerful actors in our
economy. When corporate crime is prosecuted, we are more able to
move past wrongdoing, which I refer to as the process of “societal
catharsis.” When corporate crime is not addressed, the negative effects
of corporate misconduct linger, sometimes indefinitely.
There is no doubt that corporate crime inflicts harm that must be
addressed by the criminal justice system. In some cases, corporate
crimes results in catastrophic harm. At the Upper Big Branch Mine in
West Virginia, twenty-nine miners died because of egregious
violations of the Mine Safety Act committed by Massey Corporation.137
In the Gulf oil spill, millions of barrels of oil gushed into the Gulf of
Mexico causing incalculable harm to the environment and billions of
dollars of economic losses.138 In the wake of preventable tragedies like
the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster and the Gulf oil spill, we have a
societal need to label the misconduct as criminal and condemn the
corporate malfeasance in the strongest possible terms.139 We expect
136

Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 33, at 598.
Uhlmann, 29 Dead Miners, supra note 3. An investigation by the Mine Safety
and Health Administration revealed over 300 violations of the Mine Safety and Health
Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 965 (2012), at the Upper Big Branch Mine, including nine
flagrant violations that contributed to the explosion and resulting deaths. U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION, FATAL UNDERGROUND
MINE EXPLOSION 2, 15 (2010) [hereinafter “MSHA REPORT”], available at
http://arlweb.msha.gov/Fatals/2010/UBB/FTL10c0331noappx.pdf.
138 Uhlmann, After the Spill, supra note 29, at 1414 16.
139 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1336, 1343
137
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the corporations involved to admit that their conduct was criminal
and to be held accountable by the criminal justice system, both so that
justice is done and also so that we can collectively move on from the
tragedies wrought by their corporate wrongdoing.140
The need for societal catharsis may be greatest when corporate
crime results in tragedy, but I would suggest that it also is present in
less heralded cases as well. Criminal activity tears at the social fabric
that binds us together in society.141 An essential feature of the social
contract is our collective agreement to adhere to the rule of law. To
uphold the rule of law, we must sanction those who violate the law.
We expect corporations to meet their legal obligations, just as we
expect individuals to do so; we must sanction corporate criminality
just as we must sanction individual criminality.142 By upholding the
rule of law in the face of criminal activity, we begin to repair the harm
to the social order caused by criminal conduct.
We facilitate societal catharsis in at least three other ways when we
hold corporations responsible for their criminal behavior. First, the
terminology that we use to describe the conduct matters both for its
own sake and because it affects our collective sense that justice has
been done.143 If the conduct involved is criminal, we should call it
criminal. It does not become less criminal because the actor is a
corporation. When we use non-criminal terms to describe criminal
behavior by corporations, we fuel cynicism, undermine confidence in
the justice system, and hinder societal healing. In contrast, when we
44 (discussing how “labels matter” and that “we communicate far more about our
condemnation of wrongdoing when we call conduct criminal”).
140 While the need for societal healing has not been addressed in prior accounts of
corporate criminal liability, there is a substantial body of literature regarding the
societal need for accountability in the transition from oppressive political regimes. See,
e.g., JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(2004) (defining and discussing transitional justice); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER MASS GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE (1999) (exploring societal responses to mass violence during transition to
less oppressive regimes).
141 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, The Community, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
CRIME CONTROL 193, 203 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995) (asserting
that empirical studies, although limited in number, consistently show that “crime does
in fact undermine the social and economic fabric of urban areas”).
142 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 618 19 (1998) (“Punishing corporations, just like punishing natural
persons, is also understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false
valuations that their crimes express.”).
143 Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1426 (2009) (asserting that labeling misconduct “criminal”
has social significance independent of the punishment imposed for the misconduct).
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use the proper terminology to describe the criminal conduct of
corporations, we affirm societal values, enhance confidence in the
justice system, and promote societal catharsis.144
Second, we foster societal catharsis by requiring corporations to
accept responsibility for their criminal actions. A corporation that is
charged with criminal activity must either admit guilt or face a jury
trial. The “neither admit nor deny” settlements that are common in
civil enforcement actions are not allowed in the criminal justice
system except in the rare cases where “nolo contendere” pleas are
permitted.145 By requiring admissions of guilt in cases resolved by
guilty plea, the criminal justice system insists on acceptance of
responsibility from corporations. It is difficult for us to move on from
wrongdoing when the perpetrator refuses to take responsibility and
apologize; societal catharsis is far easier when criminal activity gives
way to admissions of wrongdoing.146 Perhaps this need might be
addressed by prosecution of culpable individuals within the
corporation — and guilty pleas or convictions at trial of those
individuals. But individual culpability does not occur in a vacuum: the
acts of individual corporate employees reflect the prevailing corporate
culture and have aggregate effects on behalf of the corporation that
must be acknowledged for societal catharsis to occur.
Third, criminal punishment involves condemnation and the
imposition of blame in ways that other sanctions do not, which also
facilitates societal catharsis after criminal activity. Professor Feinberg
noted that part of the expressive function of criminal punishment was
its statement of societal resentment.147 We should not underestimate
the degree to which communities need to express their legitimate
anger in the aftermath of criminal activity. Much as we want criminal
defendants to admit their wrongdoing — or at least to be found guilty
by a trial jury — we need express our indignation about how society
144 It merits emphasis that the criminal prosecution of corporations is not a
substitute for the prosecution of culpable corporate officials. If only the corporation is
prosecuted, despite clear evidence of individual wrongdoing, societal catharsis is
undermined. See infra Part III for a discussion of the relationship between corporate
and individual prosecution.
145 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9 16.010 [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL] (discussing the strict prosecutorial policies on nolo contendere).
146 The restorative justice movement is instructive on the benefits of admissions of
wrongdoing for victims and offenders, as well as their communities. See generally
Carrie Menkel Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANNU. REV.
LAW SOC. SCI. 10.1 (2007) (defining and evaluating the effectiveness of restorative
justice).
147 Feinberg, supra note 30, at 100 01.
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has been wronged by criminal behavior.148 Expressions of anger are
part of any healing process and help us move beyond pain.149 When
there is no forum for expressing anger or resentment, those feelings
must be repressed, and moving on is difficult. This is an area where
the expressive function overlaps with retributive justifications; if the
sanction for corporate crime is non-criminal, the punishment does not
fit the crime, and societal catharsis is diminished and may not occur at
all. As Paul Robinson explains, “society as well as the victim requires
the just deserts punishment. Unless the punishment is imposed, a real
feeling of incompleteness lingers, and there is a sense that justice has
not been done. These feelings of incompleteness and sense of failed
justice are held by those who witness or become aware of the original
offense as well as by its victim.”150
Societal catharsis may seem attenuated from the purposes of
criminal law and more akin to sociological or psychological concerns.
In addition, to the extent that my focus is on how society recovers
from corporate criminality, some critics of corporate criminal liability
might argue that little is accomplished by expressing condemnation or
imposing blame on inanimate objects like corporations. Albert
Alschuler has suggested that condemning the corporation is akin to
deodand, the ancient practice of punishing animals and inanimate
objects.151 Professor Alschuler likens expression of anger toward
corporations as similar to him yelling at his computer when it
malfunctions.152 But, as noted in Part I, corporations both individually
and in the aggregate have significant impacts in our communities, in
our economies, and in our political system in ways that other
inanimate objects do not. Viewed in isolation, societal expressions of
anger about corporate misconduct may seem similar to frustration
with an animal or rage against a machine, but indignation is both an
appropriate response to corporate criminality and an expression of
community values and what behavior is unacceptable.
148 See Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim’s Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 571, 578 (2005) (arguing that community resentment and
indignation on behalf of victims is part of restorative justice process despite its
traditional focus on defendants); see also Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy, supra note 63, at
447 (arguing from a retributive perspective that corporate criminal liability can be
appropriate way of discharging our indignation in the face of corporate wrongdoing).
149 See, e.g., ELISABETH KUBLER ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING 44 (1969) (noting that
anger is the second stage in the healing process after death occurs).
150 Paul H. Robinson et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 297 (2002).
151 Alschuler, Two Ways, supra note 20, at 1372 76.
152 Id. at 1373.
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In sum, we expect justice to be done when criminal wrongdoing
occurs and no less so when the criminal violations are committed in the
corporate context. Our faith in the criminal justice system depends on
the belief that none of us are above the law and all of us are accountable
for our actions. Nothing breeds cynicism or erodes public confidence
more than perpetuating the sense that there is a different justice system
for the rich and powerful, which under almost any definition would
include corporations. Public cynicism is magnified even more by the
perception that recent Supreme Court opinions afford free speech rights
and religious liberties to corporations,153 yet corporations are not always
held accountable for their misdeeds. If corporations may be persons for
purposes of our constitutional liberties, they also should be persons for
purposes of complying with the dictates of the criminal law.154 By
holding corporations criminally liable and condemning their
misconduct, we promote the rule of law, demonstrate that the criminal
justice system can address corporate wrongdoing, and facilitate our
societal ability to move on after crimes occur.
III. THE MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROSECUTION
OF CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
Although objections to corporate criminal prosecution involve
different theoretical constructs, the critiques share one common
ground: corporate crime should be addressed by prosecuting
responsible individuals within corporations.155 Corporations face
153 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding
that, as applied to closely held corporations, regulations requiring employers to
provide female employees with no cost access to contraception violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (holding that under the First Amendment, the government cannot prevent
corporate spending to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, though
corporations may not give money directly to campaigns).
154 A more nuanced reading of Citizens United is that the public has a right to hear
all political speech
eliding the question of whether corporations are persons that
have free speech protections. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable
Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 581 (2012). Likewise, the free
exercise rights recognized in Hobby Lobby derive from the individual free exercise
rights of the owners of closely held corporations. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate
Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For Profit
Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173, 175 76 (2015). But I would argue that the public
perception that the decisions are broader and more protective of corporate interests
fuels anger about lack of accountability for corporate crime and the sense that the law
treats corporations more favorably.
155 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 39, at 407 11 (arguing that the individual must be
targeted alongside the entity); Khanna, supra note 21, at 1534 (“[C]orporate criminal
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criminal liability because the acts of their employees and agents are
imputed to the corporation. From a retributive perspective, the
culpable individuals deserve punishment, not the corporation that is
incapable of moral wrongdoing.156 From a utilitarian perspective, the
prospect of imprisonment is a greater deterrent than the possibility
that the corporation may pay a monetary fine.157 In addition,
according to both critiques, focusing on individual misconduct
ensures that criminal prosecution is targeted to culpable individuals
and not visited upon third parties, including non-culpable employees,
shareholders, and perhaps customers.158
In this Part, I explain why the prosecution of corporations is
warranted even when individuals are prosecuted. Unlike other
scholars who support a dual approach to corporate crime,159 however,
I go further and assert that corporations should be prosecuted for
corporate wrongdoing even in cases where individuals should not or
cannot be prosecuted. The need for criminal prosecution and the
expressive function of punishment may be most apparent in
“corporate-only” prosecutions.
A. Charging Both the Corporation and Culpable Individuals
The Justice Department announced in September 2015 that it would
be intensifying its efforts to hold individuals accountable for corporate
wrongdoing.160 I agree that culpable individuals should be prosecuted
in the corporate context. There is no dispute that individuals can have
moral culpability. It also is axiomatic that most corporate officials are
more likely to be deterred by the possibility that their actions could
result in individual culpability — to include jail time — than by
concerns about organizational culpability. In the hundreds of
liability may continue to provide enforcement cost savings in situations in which
pursuing managerial criminal liability is optimal.”).
156 See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the retributive critique of corporate
criminal liability.
157 See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the utilitarian critique of corporate
criminal liability.
158 Coffee, supra note 39, at 401 02.
159 See, e.g., id. at 410 (“[A] dual focus on the firm and the individual is
necessary.”); Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV.
1789, 1795 (2015) [hereinafter Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat] (arguing that
corporate prosecutions should be brought in conjunction with charges against
individuals).
160 See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Yates
Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
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corporate cases that I supervised or prosecuted during my seventeen
years at the Justice Department, it always was a priority to identify
individuals who were appropriate to prosecute, if the law and the facts
supported criminal charges. In every indictment review, we assessed
the evidence against the individuals involved in corporate wrongdoing
and evaluated whether their individual conduct warranted
prosecution.
But I reject the notion that prosecutors confronted with corporate
wrongdoing must choose between prosecuting corporations and
prosecuting individuals. Corporate crime has far-reaching and
debilitating effects on our communities. As noted throughout this
article, some corporate crimes cause catastrophic harm, such as the
Gulf oil spill, the Upper Big Branch Mine tragedy, and the Enron
case.161 Other corporate crimes may be less harmful individually but
cause significant harm in the aggregate. All corporate crime
undermines the fair competition at the heart of our economic system
— and all corporate crime involves a violation of the corporation’s
duty to conduct its affairs in a lawful manner.
Given the pernicious harm and lawless conduct inherent in
corporate crime, both corporations and individuals should be held
accountable when wrongdoing occurs in the corporate setting. At a
minimum, prosecutors and investigators should have the ability to
consider charges against both corporations and individuals, so that the
full range of enforcement options are available to address corporate
misconduct. The Justice Department prosecution guidelines recognize
these principles, making clear that there is no binary choice to be
made between prosecuting corporations and prosecuting individuals
when corporate crime occurs. “Prosecution of a corporation is not a
substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within
or without the corporation.”162 There is no reason that we should limit
societal tools to fight corporate crime, in essence taking on the task
with one hand tied behind our backs.
The prosecution of both corporations and individuals offers benefits
beyond those conferred by using all available resources to combat
corporate crime. The prosecution of corporations addresses the
wrongdoing of the corporation as a whole; the prosecution of
individuals addresses her contribution to the larger corporate
161 In the Enron case, thousands of employees lost retirement savings. Richard A.
Oppel, Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
22, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/business/employees retirement plan
is a victim as enron tumbles.html.
162 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 28.210.
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problem. The prosecution of the corporation seeks to change
corporate behavior in the future; the prosecution of the individual is
directed at the employee’s behavior in the future. The prosecution of
the corporation condemns and assigns blame to the corporate culture
and the misplaced corporate priorities that led to criminal conduct by
the employee; the prosecution of the individual addresses the poor
choices made by the individual corporate employee.
The only circumstances where I would suggest that prosecutors
might be expected to choose between the prosecution of a corporation
and the prosecution of an individual would be cases involving small
family-owned companies or sole proprietorships. In those
prosecutions, where there is effectively an identity between the
corporation and the individual, I would prosecute the individual and
decline to prosecute the corporation.163 I say so because there is
nothing to be gained in cases involving so-called “Mom and Pop”
companies and sole proprietorships — no retributive, utilitarian, or
expressive purpose — that is not already achieved by prosecuting the
owner of the company.164
In cases involving larger corporations, the calculus shifts, because
there is a corporate entity that is larger and distinct from its individual
members, with influence over the conduct of corporate affairs that
even a senior management official is unlikely to possess. In the rare
case where a larger corporation is the alter ego of its board chairman
or its chief executive officer — and where that person carried out
unlawful activity on behalf of the corporation — it theoretically might
be possible to satisfy the goals of criminal prosecution by charging
only the chairman or chief executive officer. In all other cases, as
explained in greater detail below, I would argue that charges must be
brought against the corporation and responsible individuals — and
that charges should be brought against the corporation even when no
individual can or should be charged.

163 Buell, Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, supra note 25, at 535 n.263
(“It is hard to see the justification for entity criminal liability in cases of sole or near
sole proprietorships. Assuming that entity liability is implicated because of the owner’s
crime, the entity effectively represents just another personal asset of the offender.”).
164 Accord Lynch, supra note 49, at 51 (small and closely held corporations are
“unlikely to be perceived by the public as having any separate personality” from their
individual owners and managers). Stated differently, in Mom and Pop companies
there is no corporate culture independent of the owners nor corporate
blameworthiness independent of the culpability of the owners. See id.
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B. Charging the Corporation and Management Officials
The Justice Department corporate prosecution principals make
management involvement in misconduct a key factor in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion involving corporations.165 An argument could
be made that prosecution of the corporation is not needed if senior
officials have been prosecuted; the corporation will be forever changed
by those individual prosecutions and civil enforcement may be
sufficient against the corporation. Yet where senior officials are
involved, the culpability of the corporation qua corporation appears
greatest; it would seem incongruous to decline criminal prosecution of
the corporation when misconduct reached senior management.
In Part II, I referenced the prosecution of McWane, Inc., which
occurred during my tenure as Chief of the Environmental Crimes
Section at the Justice Department.166 In the McWane prosecutions, we
brought charges against five McWane subsidiaries: Atlantic States Cast
Iron Pipe Company, McWane Cast Iron Pipe Company, Pacific States
Cast Iron Pipe Company, Tyler Pipe, and Union Foundry.167 Three of
the subsidiaries pleaded guilty; two of the subsidiaries were convicted
after trials.168 We also prosecuted eleven management officials at three
of the McWane subsidiaries; eight were convicted at trial, and one
pleaded guilty.169 The ability to bring charges against the companies
and the management of the McWane facilities addressed years of
criminal violations of the environmental laws and the worker safety
laws at McWane facilities.170 It was essential to hold criminally
responsible the management officials who carried out the wrongdoing.
But it was not a coincidence that there were violations at five separate
McWane facilities. There was a larger corporate culture responsible for
the crimes at McWane,171 which would not have been addressed

165 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 28.500 (containing a section
entitled “Pervasiveness of Wrongdoing Within the Corporation”).
166 See supra notes 93 94 and accompanying text.
167 Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 7.
168 Id.
169 James Sandler et al., The McWane Prosecutions, FRONTLINE (Feb. 5, 2008),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/mcwane/etc/prosecutions.html.
170 Id.; see David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Criminal Inquiry Under Way at Large
Pipe Manufacturer, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/
15/us/criminal inquiry under way at large pipe manufacturer.html.
171 Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment, supra note 85, at 7; see also A
Dangerous Business: Two Companies, Two Visions, FRONTLINE (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter
Two Companies], http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/workplace/mcwane/
two.html (describing the “McWane Way”).
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without criminal charges and convictions of the five McWane
subsidiaries.
I also have referenced several times the Upper Big Branch Mine
tragedy, where twenty-nine workers died because of willful violations
of the Mine Safety Act. In that case, four Massey Corporation officials
were convicted and sentenced to jail time.172 In addition, prosecutors
charged Don Blankenship, the chief executive officer of Massey and
allegedly the prime orchestrator of the criminal conduct at the
company.173 According to the indictment, Blankenship was the kind of
“iron-fisted” chief executive officer who could be charged in lieu of
the corporation. Prosecutors alleged that Blankenship controlled every
aspect of Massey’s operation in almost despot-like fashion.174
Blankenship was convicted at trial of conspiracy to violate the Mine
Safety Act and was sentenced to serve one year in prison.175
Still, I would argue that Massey also should have been prosecuted,
given the deadly harm caused by their crimes and the hundreds of
violations of federal mining laws committed at their mines.176 Massey
was a notorious violator of mine safety and environmental laws.177 It
flouted the rule of law and deserved societal condemnation and blame
for the horrors it wrought as a company. Instead, Massey’s new
owners were allowed to enter a non-prosecution agreement that sent a
demoralizing message about how the government viewed the
misconduct that led to tragedy at the Upper Big Branch mine.178

172 Convictions Related to the Upper Big Branch Mine, CHARLESTON GAZETTE MAIL (Nov.
13, 2014), http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20141113/GZ01/141119614/1460.
173 Indictment, United States v. Blankenship, No. 5:14 cr 00244 (S.D. W. Va., Nov.
13, 2014) [hereinafter Blankenship Indictment]; see Trip Gabriel, Ex Executive Donald
Blankenship Is Indicted in Disaster at Coal Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2014, at A12.
174 See Blankenship Indictment, supra note 173.
175 Alan Blinder, Mine Chief Is Sentenced in Conspiracy Over Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2016, at A12; Alan Blinder, Ex Chief of Massey Energy Guilty of Misdemeanor After Mine
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2015, at A18.
176 MSHA REPORT, supra note 137, at 2, 12; see also Uhlmann, 29 Dead Miners,
supra note 3 (describing finding by MSHA that Massey’s “unlawful policies and
practices” were the “root cause” of the nation’s worst mining disaster in 40 years).
177 Uhlmann, Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 1, at 1295 97.
178 Id. at 1300 (“[O]n the same day that MSHA issued a 972 page investigative
report that lay bare the lawlessness that occurred within Massey, the Justice
Department announced that it was entering a non prosecution agreement with the
new owners of Massey and therefore would not bring criminal charges against the
company.”).
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C. Charging the Corporation and Lower-Level Supervisors
The need for corporate prosecution may be even greater in cases
where only lower-level supervisors can be charged with wrongdoing.
In cases where the only individuals who can be charged are at low
levels within the corporate hierarchy, the weight of criminal
prosecution falls on individuals who, while culpable, had no control
over the corporate policies that led to criminal activity. The Gulf oil
spill provides a classic example. There is widespread agreement that
the Gulf oil spill involved a failure of corporate culture of epic
proportions. BP had a corporate culture that promoted risk-taking in
its drilling operations, at the expense of environmental protection and
worker safety; the corporate policies and priorities that fostered that
culture were determined to be the root cause of the spill.179 Yet the
only individuals who had enough personal involvement in the spill to
be charged with crimes — the well site leaders who were the top
“company men” on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig — had no role
in the development of BP’s policies or its corporate culture.180
I have questioned whether the BP well site leaders should have been
charged criminally in the Gulf oil spill, which effectively made the
statement that they personally were responsible for thirteen deaths
and catastrophic environmental harm in an oil spill caused by
corporate failure far beyond their control.181 Perhaps there was
sufficient evidence of the culpability of the well site leaders to justify
criminal charges against them. Indeed, the government alleged in the
superseding indictment that the defendants “negligently and grossly
179 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 122 26
(2011), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO
OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
180 See Christina Bergmann, Oil Giant BP Faces Record Fine, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 17,
2012), http://www.dw.de/oil giant bp faces record fine/a 16386244 (“‘This was a corporate
culture run amok.’ . . . ‘There were issues with this well for weeks and months prior to the
blowout. . . . You obviously can’t blame all of that on the rig supervisors.’”); Tom Fowler &
Russell Gold, Engineers Deny Charges in BP Spill, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323622904578127173280594296
(“It
raises the question if it’s fair to charge these individuals who had no influence or authority
over these policies and this culture.”); Ameet Sachdev, BP Criminal Liability Influenced by
1985 Chicago Case, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 18, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012 11
18/business/ct biz 1118 corporate mal 20121118 1 deepwater horizon workplace
safety gary leviton/2 (“‘Every study, even the government’s own investigations, have
concluded that the spill occurred because of corporate management failures’ . . . . ‘It’s a fair
question whether there are individuals higher up in the corporate chain of command who
were involved in decisions that led to the spill.’”).
181 See Fowler & Gold, supra note 180.
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negligently failed to maintain control of the Macondo well.”182 Or the
defendants may have been scapegoats in a case where the government
was determined to find individual culpability for the worst
environmental disaster in United States history.
In December 2015, the Justice Department dropped the remaining
manslaughter charges against the BP well site leaders, leaving only a
charge of negligent violation of the Clean Water Act.183 One of the
well site leaders, Donald Vidrine, pleaded guilty to the Clean Water
Act charge, which is a misdemeanor, and is awaiting sentencing.184
The other well site leader, Robert Kaluza, was acquitted at trial in
February 2016.185 But even if the government had successfully
prosecuted both of the well site leaders, it would have been wrong to
hold only those two individuals criminally responsible for the spill and
the deaths that resulted. The government properly charged BP — as
well as Transocean, the drilling company — with criminal violations
of the Clean Water Act for their corporate negligence.186 To proceed
otherwise would have indulged the counter-factual that only two
relatively low-level supervisors were responsible for the spill despite
abundant evidence of corporate failings in which they had no part.
These were corporate crimes; prosecutors properly charged BP and
Transocean.187
182 Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Kaluza, No. 12 265 (Nov. 14,
2012).
183 Margaret Cronin Fisk & Laurel Brubaker Calkins, BP Well Site Managers’ Oil Spill
Manslaughter Case Dropped, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015 12 02/bp well site leaders win dismissal of u s manslaughter case.
184 Id.
185 Aruna Viswanatha, US Bid to Prosecute BP Staff in Gulf Oil Spill Falls Flat, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u s bid to prosecute bp staff in
gulf oil spill falls flat 1456532116.
186 Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&prosecution
summary id=2468 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (describing the criminal proceedings brought
against BP Exploration and Production and Transocean, and their subsequent guilty pleas).
187 A different scenario might be presented if criminal activity occurred despite the
best efforts of the corporation to comply with the law. If the corporation had an
exemplary compliance program and individuals engaged in wrongdoing despite the
fact that the company conducted its affairs in a manner that we would consider
normatively desirable, it might be appropriate to prosecute only the culpable
individuals. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 28.500 (“[I]t may not be
appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust
compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single
isolated act of a rogue employee.”) In my experience, however, the existence of such
“rogue employees” is usually attributable to shortcomings in the company’s training,
supervision, or compliance programs, despite fervent claims to the contrary from
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D. Charging the Corporation and No Individuals
The need for corporate prosecution may be greatest in the most
criticized — and most misunderstood — cases: prosecutions where no
individuals are charged. Some of the concerns about corporate-only
prosecutions are valid. Prosecutors should not pursue corporate-only
prosecutions in exchange for not prosecuting individuals,188 which is a
misuse of prosecutorial discretion and creates the appearance that
corporations can buy-off charges against corporate officials. Nor
should prosecutors resolve cases with corporate-only prosecutions
because they are unwilling to invest the time and effort required to
prosecute individuals. Likewise, prosecutors should not bring
corporate-only charges based on weak evidence that corporations
might not contest because of the difficulty of defending corporate
cases or to avoid the scrutiny of a trial.
In my experience, however, most corporate-only prosecutions occur
because, while individuals could be charged, prosecution of those
individuals is not appropriate as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
As a threshold matter, prosecutors only should consider criminal
charges if there is sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and if they are confident that they can address any
legal issues and defenses that may be raised by the defendant.189 But
the decision to charge does not end with an evaluation of the evidence
and possible defenses. Prosecutors also must consider principles of
fairness and justice to ensure that charges are reserved for the conduct
and defendants that are culpable.190
In the regulatory crime context, significant violations could occur at
a company where the only individuals with sufficient knowledge to be
defense counsel.
188 See Yates Memo, supra note 160, at 5 (“Absent extraordinary circumstances, no
corporate resolution will provide protection from criminal or civil liability for any
individuals.”). But see Garrett, Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, supra note 159, at
1791 (finding that, between 2001 and 2014, charges were brought against individuals
in only 34% of deferred and non prosecution agreements).
189 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 145, § 9 27.220 (advising a prosecutor
to initiate charges only if “the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain
and sustain a conviction”); David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 164 (2014) [hereinafter
Prosecutorial Discretion] (arguing that “prosecutors should only bring charges if there
is sufficient evidence to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt”).
190 Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 189, at 215 (“Prosecutors thus
have reserved criminal prosecution for culpable conduct and avoided charges based
on technical violations or when defendants acted in good faith.”).
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charged criminally are low-level employees — not even supervisors —
who never received sufficient training or the resources necessary to
comply with the law. Their supervisors, who might make better targets
based on their higher status within the company, may have had no
better training and no more resources. Yet higher up the corporate
ladder, where responsibility for poor training and inadequate
resources resides, management officials may not have enough
knowledge to be charged with crimes. In those cases, where crimes
occurred and there is a need for accountability, condemnation, and
societal catharsis, it may not be fair or just to charge the employees or
even their immediate supervisors.191 Instead, charges should be
brought against the corporation that did not provide the training or
the resources that its employees needed to meet the company’s legal
obligations.
Other corporate-only prosecutions occur because it is not possible
to prosecute individuals. As the First Circuit recognized in Bank of
New England,192 there are cases where corporate crime occurs but it is
not possible to develop sufficient evidence against individuals to
charge them with wrongdoing. Corporations compartmentalize
knowledge and subdivide operational duties to promote corporate
efficiency.193 In cases like Bank of New England where the corporate
structure makes it impossible to charge individuals, there still is a
societal need to address the wrongdoing. In those cases, the only
potential defendant is the corporation.194 Prosecutors must choose
between prosecuting the offending corporation and refusing to bring
criminal charges despite clear evidence of corporate wrongdoing.
In two of the McWane prosecutions, Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry,
there was a similar problem with charging individuals. At both Tyler
Pipe and Union Foundry, a worker died because of willful violations
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”).195 But the
OSH Act only allows criminal charges to be brought against the
employer, which in both cases was the McWane subsidiary where the
191 Lynch, supra note 49, at 52 (stating that a corporate prosecution is appropriate
“where the individuals who can be punished are insufficiently important to bear the
weight of stigma appropriately attaching to the harmfulness or offensiveness of the
wrong”).
192 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
193 See id. at 856 (“Since the Bank had the compartmentalized structure common to
all large corporations, the court’s collective knowledge instruction was not only
proper but necessary.”).
194 Lynch, supra note 49, at 52 (stating that a corporate prosecution is appropriate
“when no individual can be proven culpable”).
195 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
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deaths occurred.196 The Justice Department faced a choice: either
prosecute Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry for the worker deaths or no
criminal charges would be brought. Absent criminal prosecution,
Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry would have faced only modest
administrative fines under the OSH Act.197 The Justice Department
therefore prosecuted McWane and obtained a $4.25 million criminal
penalty in the Tyler Pipe case and a $3.5 million criminal penalty in
the Union Foundry case, in addition to far-reaching compliance
agreements for improvements at both facilities.198
I would suggest that corporate-only prosecutions like those
involving Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry may provide the best
examples of why criminal prosecution of corporations is so essential.
Both cases involved tragic worker deaths at facilities that had years of
worker safety violations. The conduct was egregious enough to
deserve criminal sanction, and prior fines had not convinced the
companies to comply with the law.199 Corporations exist for lawful
purposes only, not to engage in the rampant misconduct that took
place at McWane’s plants.
As I explained in Part I, there are retributive and utilitarian
justifications for corporate criminal prosecution, particularly in cases
like Tyler Pipe and Union Foundry. But the expressive function of
criminal prosecution is highlighted most by the Tyler Pipe and Union
Foundry cases. Criminal prosecution of Tyler Pipe and Union
Foundry upheld the rule of law at facilities where it was under siege
and made clear that companies are expected to provide a safe work
place for their employees. Criminal prosecution also ensured societal
condemnation of conduct at McWane that was reprehensible.
McWane needed to be held accountable for a deplorable corporate
culture — “the McWane Way” — that allowed worker safety and
environmental violations at multiple McWane facilities, in Alabama,
New Jersey, Texas, and Utah.200
196

Id.
Under the OSH Act, the maximum administrative penalty for willful or repeated
violations is $70,000 per violation. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012).
198 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Division of McWane, Inc. Sentenced to
$4.25 Million in Criminal Fines & Community Service Related to Worker Safety,
Environmental Crime (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/
opa/pr/2005/September/05 enrd 458.html.
199 Barstow & Bergman, supra note 170 (“The company has been cited for more
than 400 safety violations and 450 environmental violations since 1995. While the
company has paid roughly $10 million in fines and penalties, no McWane official has
ever gone to jail for these violations.”).
200 See Two Companies, supra note 171 (describing the “McWane Way”).
197
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Without criminal charges against the corporate defendants in Tyler
Pipe and Union Foundry, the worker deaths that occurred at the
McWane facilities would not have been crimes at all. There would
have been no accountability, no justice for the families of the victims,
and no opportunity for catharsis of any kind. Anything less than
criminal prosecution of the McWane facilities would have expressed
the wrong societal values: that worker deaths, even when they occur
because of willful violations of the law, are just a cost of doing
business; that the most egregious safety violations do not warrant
societal condemnation; and that the suffering of McWane’s victims
were just a matter for monetary penalties and tort claims. For the
families of those victims and for the communities where McWane was
a prominent company operating outside the law, justice required the
strongest possible condemnation of McWane and admissions by the
company that it had committed crimes. The collective sense that
justice was served in Alabama and Texas — and in the other states
where McWane routinely broke the law — was an essential ingredient
for the affected communities to heal and face the future more
confident that corporate lawlessness would not be tolerated.
CONCLUSION
Although most companies take their legal obligations seriously and
contribute in positive ways to their communities, corporate crime
occurs with alarming regularity. When corporations engage in
criminal activity, their misconduct must be addressed by the criminal
justice system. Corporate crime harms our economy, our workers, and
the environment. Corporate crime has moral content, insofar as
corporations have internal decision structures that allow them to act
intentionally and therefore morally. Corporations have cultures that
influence the conduct of individual corporate officials and a separate
identity that may be deserving of punishment. From a utilitarian
perspective, criminal prosecution is a stronger deterrent for corporate
misconduct than civil enforcement and more likely to change the
corporate cultures that foster criminal behavior.
Corporate crime warrants the condemnation that the criminal law
provides. The prosecution of corporations and culpable individuals
within offending companies is necessary to uphold the rule of law,
validate the choices of law-abiding companies, and provide
accountability. Together those values contribute to our sense that
justice has been done when crime occurs, which enhances trust in the
legal system, provides the opportunity for societal catharsis that is
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essential to healing, and allows us to move forward in the aftermath of
criminal activity.
We must hold corporations accountable even when individual
defendants cannot be prosecuted — indeed, especially when
individuals cannot be prosecuted — lest we send the message that
corporations are above the law. When corporations face no
consequences for their criminal behavior, cynicism increases about the
role of corporations in our society. When corporations engage in
misconduct that is criminal, we must be prepared to make clear that
their conduct is criminal and uphold the core societal values expressed
by the criminal law.

